Wow thanks @22Trucks! I was hoping for a reply but I didn't expect a full article. Thanks for extending the question to its logical consequences and not just stopping at the (true) point that a major-ish counterattack doesn't serve the _current_ Ukrainian strategy but might serve an updated one.
There's a lot to unpack in your post so I'll be chewing on it more and maybe have other thoughts later. For now though, I have to say I'm fascinated with the idea of the hit-and-run antics inside Russian borders as you recommend. Would it really destabilize the Putin regime by itself? Probably not, but if he kept proving impotent at countering those breaches of sovereignty along with all the other economic damage Ukraine is inflicting, maybe it could be the straw that breaks the camel's back.
As for the direct encirclements, I get it that there aren't too many exposed Russian salients. But when I say "brittleness" I just suspect there are areas where if there's a Uk breakthrough with a force of a brigade or two, the nominal reinforcements either:
a) can't get there to help because they have no vehicles any more, lack fuel, or can be easily interdicted by FPV drones
b) don't exist in the strength that's on paper (falsified staffing or loss reports)
or c) Aren't effective in mobile defense because of lack of training, command, or discipline.
I don't know many of the Ru units, but attacking wherever the "famous" 155th Naval Infantry Brigade was always a pretty sure bet in the past...
Breaking through… A “breakthrough” is not a goal unto itself. You break through to go somewhere and do something. The point to much of the article is that there doesn’t seem to be much that really counts as a goal. Russia doesn’t seem to have much in the way of key points to go after. “Breaking through” does little to advance the cause of defeating the Russian army.
As for the 155th, latest info is they are about 20 kms behind the front lines SE of Hulyaipole.
Also, I read that Ukraine is indeed counterattacking near Lyman, though south (Torske and Yampil) rather than north. Do you think this is part of a larger operation or just a way of alleviating pressure on Lyman itself?
I was thinking about your "breakthrough is not a goal unto itself" and of course that's true. But by breaking through on defense I think you do two very valuable things:
1. You force the attackers to go on mobile defense when they haven't been adequately trained or equipped for that. This pressure makes the possibility of a mistake (slow reaction, lack of coordinated movements with adjoining groups of forces) much higher. If they make a bad enough mistake, then you may be able to achieve rapid gains toward a significant goal that seemed unlikely beforehand.
2. Even though the exchange ratio in attack is going to be worse than static defense (unless you start routing the opposing force), the counterattacking force in taking the initiative also gets to influence the number of enemy casualties in absolute terms. i.e. In defense, you can only inflict casualties on the forces the enemy chooses to put at risk in assaults, but they can always pull back before losses put their positions at risk. If you get a breakthrough then you get to decide when to stop. If the Ru forces are already underwater in force regeneration, this could put them over the edge and force them into a larger retreat to tidy up their lines, or into a larger blunder if their political leaders don't allow said retreat.
Now of course Uk has to have sufficient troops to afford higher losses in these attacks, especially initially, but that was sort of the conceit/premise of this whole exercise :)
Russia’s force regeneration issues aren’t large enough right now for the scenario you describe. Remember, the Russia’s recruitment issues only apply to soldiers they send into Ukraine. Soldiers staying in Russia are a completely different force, and there are no problems there because they are career soldiers and mandatory service soldiers, and Russia can simply call people up for ‘reserve defense’ unit service. If Putin gets desperate enough, he will simply throw more career and mandatory service soldiers into Ukraine, as he has done in the past up to the present. There are still hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, and they’re not spread out in attacking formations like they were in 2022.
Wow thanks @22Trucks! I was hoping for a reply but I didn't expect a full article. Thanks for extending the question to its logical consequences and not just stopping at the (true) point that a major-ish counterattack doesn't serve the _current_ Ukrainian strategy but might serve an updated one.
There's a lot to unpack in your post so I'll be chewing on it more and maybe have other thoughts later. For now though, I have to say I'm fascinated with the idea of the hit-and-run antics inside Russian borders as you recommend. Would it really destabilize the Putin regime by itself? Probably not, but if he kept proving impotent at countering those breaches of sovereignty along with all the other economic damage Ukraine is inflicting, maybe it could be the straw that breaks the camel's back.
As for the direct encirclements, I get it that there aren't too many exposed Russian salients. But when I say "brittleness" I just suspect there are areas where if there's a Uk breakthrough with a force of a brigade or two, the nominal reinforcements either:
a) can't get there to help because they have no vehicles any more, lack fuel, or can be easily interdicted by FPV drones
b) don't exist in the strength that's on paper (falsified staffing or loss reports)
or c) Aren't effective in mobile defense because of lack of training, command, or discipline.
I don't know many of the Ru units, but attacking wherever the "famous" 155th Naval Infantry Brigade was always a pretty sure bet in the past...
Breaking through… A “breakthrough” is not a goal unto itself. You break through to go somewhere and do something. The point to much of the article is that there doesn’t seem to be much that really counts as a goal. Russia doesn’t seem to have much in the way of key points to go after. “Breaking through” does little to advance the cause of defeating the Russian army.
As for the 155th, latest info is they are about 20 kms behind the front lines SE of Hulyaipole.
Also, I read that Ukraine is indeed counterattacking near Lyman, though south (Torske and Yampil) rather than north. Do you think this is part of a larger operation or just a way of alleviating pressure on Lyman itself?
I was thinking about your "breakthrough is not a goal unto itself" and of course that's true. But by breaking through on defense I think you do two very valuable things:
1. You force the attackers to go on mobile defense when they haven't been adequately trained or equipped for that. This pressure makes the possibility of a mistake (slow reaction, lack of coordinated movements with adjoining groups of forces) much higher. If they make a bad enough mistake, then you may be able to achieve rapid gains toward a significant goal that seemed unlikely beforehand.
2. Even though the exchange ratio in attack is going to be worse than static defense (unless you start routing the opposing force), the counterattacking force in taking the initiative also gets to influence the number of enemy casualties in absolute terms. i.e. In defense, you can only inflict casualties on the forces the enemy chooses to put at risk in assaults, but they can always pull back before losses put their positions at risk. If you get a breakthrough then you get to decide when to stop. If the Ru forces are already underwater in force regeneration, this could put them over the edge and force them into a larger retreat to tidy up their lines, or into a larger blunder if their political leaders don't allow said retreat.
Now of course Uk has to have sufficient troops to afford higher losses in these attacks, especially initially, but that was sort of the conceit/premise of this whole exercise :)
Russia’s force regeneration issues aren’t large enough right now for the scenario you describe. Remember, the Russia’s recruitment issues only apply to soldiers they send into Ukraine. Soldiers staying in Russia are a completely different force, and there are no problems there because they are career soldiers and mandatory service soldiers, and Russia can simply call people up for ‘reserve defense’ unit service. If Putin gets desperate enough, he will simply throw more career and mandatory service soldiers into Ukraine, as he has done in the past up to the present. There are still hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, and they’re not spread out in attacking formations like they were in 2022.