Where to Attack?

In a dreamworld, where should Ukraine attack Russia on the ground?

As part of a “daydreaming on acetate” (see Note 1, if you’re curious) exercise, I’ve been asked look at the following question (paraphrased a bit):

I know you’re averse to Ukraine risking large-scale offensive operations … (I am)

The quality of RU soldiers and equipment seems to be on the decline, and recent reports also indicate they’re now on the wrong side of the force-regeneration/ recruiting curve… (The current, though possibly biased, snippets we see seem to point in that direction.)

At some point isn’t it worth gathering a force strong enough to push somewhere hard enough to test for that brittleness? … Whether you agree that now is the time or not (and I know you think “not!”), I was still curious to hear where you think such a push would be most effective.

With any war situation, there are military implications and political implications. We will look first at this militarily. To do that, let’s back off and examine this with the assumption that we have a half dozen brigades squirrelled away somewhere that are manned, equipped, and available.

The first question is “Why?”. There are, as I see it, two answers. The first is to further Ukraine’s current strategy. The second is to change Ukraine’s strategy. Let’s take a look at the first.

What is Ukraine’s strategy to prevail in this thing overall? How would such an attack fit with and further that strategy? Based on current and past actions and statements, Ukraine’s strategy appears to be:

1. Attack the economic/monetary basis for Russia’s existence. Fancy words for hit the petroleum industry.

2. Bleed Russia of manpower quickly enough that the Russians cannot resupply at a sufficient rate without making politically dangerous moves (more aggressive “recruitment” or even mobilization).

3. Cause so much trouble in the above (economic and manpower) that the Putin regime fails politically.

4. Attack weapons making capabilities. I believe this is more a defensive move to try to reduce Russia’s ability to continue aerial attacks (drones, missiles, and glide bombs) against Ukraine’s populace instead of primarily an attempt to “win.”

So, that basically means 1) adversely affect the economic base and/or 2) cause many more Russian casualties (people and/or equipment) without taking higher damage to the Ukrainian force. How would a big attack further these goals?

Attacking the Economy:

I can find no GROUND attack that accomplishes this. Going after Belgorod might do some damage, but that’s a suicide mission 50 kms into a real city of several hundred thousand with an ample military foundation. It’s not realistic.

Having to fend off a major ground attack would chew into Russia’s supply of some resources (petrol, ammo, etc.), but Russia is doing that already with its attacks into Ukrainians dug in to defenses. In other words, defending accomplishes the same thing. So, we dispense with this one quickly.

Causing Mass Casualties:

As we have discussed many times, the attacker tends to take higher casualties in a toe-to-toe fight than the defender. An exception to this is if an attack “bags” a bunch of the enemy by cutting them off and capturing (or otherwise eliminating) them. I went along the forward trace and found two possible locations where a Ukrainian attack could encircle some Russians, but they are relatively small. They could be a tactical victory (a few hundred), but not a strategic one. A couple hundred scraggly old guys in captivity is not our goal here.

The two spots where Russian forces are slightly at risk of encirclement are:

• Ivanivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (48° 4’32N 36°38’38E): It sticks out enough to be a tempting target.

  

  However, the Russians have the tiny Vovcha River helping guard the two exposed flanks, so probably forget that one.

• Novoselivka, Donetsk Oblast (49° 4’48N 37°42’49E): There are two possible versions of this depending on which of the mappers you believe is right and based on how cheerleader confident you are about Ukraine’s ability to pull it off.

Mapper - Project Owl - Conservative: This mapper has a relatively small Russian force sticking out far enough to be a target, but not so large and isolated that they are “ripe for picking.”

Lopping off the force threatening this town would have the added advantage of taking pressure off Lyman, but it’s not a very “Grand Gesture” that is going to make international press. You would likely only get a couple hundred soldiers for a 12 km attack (or two 6’s), so it’s hardly worth the effort of a “big attack.”

Mapper - Russo-Ukrainian War (Modern Great Game) – Aggressive: This mapper shows a different layout of the lines and has the Russians MUCH more exposed.

A 10 km attack heading SE towards the lakes (light BLUE squiggly line) accompanied by a 2 kms advance W out of Lyman and covering a couple of gaps in the Terny area with a cloud of drones that kill anything that moves could theoretically put several Russian regiments in a world o’ hurt. However, this would be next to impossible to pull off since the attacking force would need to move into position undetected up a long narrow gap and attack with its back to the Oskil River.

Finally, I have no way of knowing if those artificially created lakes are still there. The earthen dams and berms could be (and probably are) damaged. However, the ground is likely difficult to cross regardless, even if most of the standing water is gone.

This one has SOME possibilities, but there is no concealing the Ukrainian force as it moves N along the E side of the Oskil River in preparation for the attack and it would be ripe for bombardment, so probably not a good idea.

Thus, I see no big encirclements where Ukraine’s battling Brigades could bag a big batch o’ Boris’s. To do that, the enemy must be concentrated somewhere. The Russians are concentrated near Kupyansk, Lyman/Sloviansk/Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole. None of these places is configured in such a way that they present an opportunity for such a move. Most are shaped exactly the opposite, threatening Ukrainian forces with encirclement. AND THAT IS DONE ON PURPOSE by the Russians as we have seen many times now.

Overall, an attack would kill Russians, but a defense would likely kill more and, in doing so, kill fewer Ukrainians. So with the economy and casualties not affected in the right way by an attack, such an attack does not really fit with existing strategy.

What about a change in strategy, then?

If you’re gonna try something like that, it can’t be just “another attack.” It can’t be just a pushback of a Russian gain that will be retaken by the typical Russian slow ooze over the next 6-12 months. If you’re going to do this, it needs to at least have the chance of being a killing blow. What change in strategy are we talking about, then?

Can Ukraine cut the Russians in half? No. They have insufficient resources to do something like this. Remember all of those defenses the Russians built a couple of years ago that most folks incorrectly credited with stopping the Ukrainian offensive (Note 2)? They are still there! They’re a bit worn down, but a couple of days (or perhaps even hours) can turn them back into positions that would be a challenge to overtake.

Change in Military Strategy:

What killing blow is there along the front that destabilizes the Russian army in a big way? A crossing of the Dnipro River in a big way might have that effect, but it is not logistically and technically feasible, as I have been saying for a couple of years and for years it has proven to be so.

DOWNSTREAM of the ex-dam, that is.

The only question mark I have, the only slight doubt, is the area that used to be the Kakhovka Reservoir. What is the ground like now that it has been exposed? We’re coming up on three years, now. I know the reservoir basin is VASTLY different with some areas turning into a woodland. How wide and deep is the remaining riverbed? I know there are lakes and ponds through much of the area, but there are likely some traversable pathways across. Could they support an army crossing in force? Hundreds of vehicles? My impression based on limited available evidence (even Google Earth is intentionally fuzzed out) is that this is unlikely. Additionally, one must ask the obvious question: What would the goal of such an attack be?

• Nova Kakhovka: A nice piece of real estate, but hardly a “killing blow.” It accomplishes little militarily. Let’s say you capture the town. Now what? “ONWARD TO CRIMEA!” Nuh uh. 70 kms across enemy territory just to reach the first of three fortified lines 30 kms deep on the narrow Perekop Isthmus while protecting flanks and providing logistics on one road… Ain’t gonna happen.

• The Nuke Plant: This would be a HUGE political statement, but a risky proposition that could backfire in several ways both politically and physically (as in “physics”). It really gains you nothing militarily. And once you own it it’s a target and you own it.

• Kamyanske: The far E tip of the reservoir. This was once one of my daydreams, so I’ve studied it as a “Big Deal.” Being able to attack around the thick, heavy defensive lines at Kamyanske, to move around those lines to its W (through the ex-reservoir) could, theoretically, be a pretty Big Deal as it could open the door to an attack on Tokmak. You don’t even have to cross the river itself because you’re already on the correct side!

  However, there are MORE defensive line to overcome to get to Tokmak even in this direction. Also, I’m pretty sure there are largish lakes still in the old reservoir area here that make this not a feasible idea militarily and logistically. That’s why I discarded it before. Also, what does Tokmak really matter now at this late stage? The accurate range of Ukrainian drone and missile resources has expanded so that “getting within artillery range of their railroads” really isn’t a thing anymore. Tokmak would be nice to have, but it is not a “killing blow,” militarily.

Let’s skip to the other end of the line, now.

Attacking into Russia:

There really isn’t anything along the Russian border that is a “Big Deal” other than one spot: N of Vovchansk. If Ukraine could attack behind Vovchansk and isolate the Russian force there, that would be a pretty big deal. Having said that, it’s a much smaller deal than it used to be. There used to be bunches of Russkies up there. Now, there appears to be a Brigade and two Regiments still hanging around that rubble pile. It would be nice to bag them, though.

However, the town behind Vovchansk on the Russian side is Shebekino. It and the very spread out smaller towns and villages connected to it are almost the size of Pokrovsk, in total. A high casualty urban slugfest is not the “lightning strike” we had in mind. Additionally, there are several Russian units within 30 kms of the town that could be on-site within a day or two, so this is not a realistic option.

Attacking in Luhansk or Donetsk:

In other words, somewhere along the current main front line. There are plenty of places where an attack would do worlds of good, pushing the Russians back and keeping them from accomplishing their objectives. However, these are reactive, not proactive. These are not “killer blows” that shatter some place in the Russian line. Remembering that this is, at first, a military examination and that we will look at the politics later, I see nothing that isn’t simply “pushing back.” If we are trying to kill Russians while protecting our own, attacking straight into Russia’s forces doesn’t seem to do this.

Will the whole Russian army pick up and run home as a result of one of these attacks? Without a collapse at home (a political discussion), no, they won’t. Will you crack the line somewhere? Quite possibly. But what then? Are you going to attack 50 kms into their rear while protecting your flanks and supporting the force logistically while you run out from underneath your air defense umbrella and into the prepared defenses from 2-3 years ago inflicting more casualties than you take? No. That isn’t realistic.

So, the question remains: Militarily, what are you trying to accomplish with an attack?

Now, let’s have a look at the politics.

I claim zero expertise in Russian politics. I see articles that say the Putin may be running out of slack in his rope, that perhaps that slack will tighten and snap that pasty white neck of his. Is this so? I have no idea. If one of our strategic objectives is to stir that pot some, then attacks may serve a purpose.

What I originally saw as the purpose of the Kursk adventure and wholly supported at the time was that it exposed Putin to ridicule and derision both internally and internationally since it showed he could not even protect his own country. Running in there and mucking around for a few weeks then withdrawing in good order to go ahead and do it again somewhere else was, I thought, a brilliant move. Then it stretched on for 7 months and ended in a shambles with Russia following the Ukrainian force into Ukraine itself.

Politically Bash Putin:

Take a couple of fast brigades with lots of engineering support and attack into Russia. Stay within artillery support and small drone range of Ukrainian territory. Blow some shit up. Make headlines. Draw Russian forces towards you. Then get the hell out. Six weeks max. Move somewhere else. Rinse and repeat.

The goal isn’t to hold territory for negotiations (a ludicrous suggestion). The goal is to weaken political support for the Russian government. You do this by spreading the pain around, by causing as much embarrassment in as many places as possible. Combine it with very visible drone attacks on military and economic targets elsewhere and oil depots and shipping terminals burning for days on end.

Is this a worthy political goal? Possibly. Can this be done somewhere in Ukraine as well? Maybe threaten a big unit so-as to cause some panic, then pull back? Possibly. Blow in 8-10 kms, threaten the 29^th CAA (Combined Arms Army) HQ near Novodarivka, maybe blow up a General just for the hell of it, pull back before their reserves arrive or before you run out of ammo, whichever happens first.

It’s about the APPEARANCE of Russian weakness, not the actual territory crossed or held. While I do not know Russian internal politics, I do know that weakness does not go over well in Russia or with any authoritarian government. Do this a couple of times with panache and lots of pictures on the internets and maybe, just maybe, the Russian army will get as sick of it as the Russian rich-folk and Russian war-mongers bloggers seem to be.

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Do I see an opportunity to attack Russia if I had an attack force to spare? Yes, I do. But it is not a military attack. It is a politic attack accomplished with a military resource. Unfortunately, that handfull of Brigades is not sitting around ready to go.

Notes:

1. We used to cover our maps carefully with one-sided sticky acetate so we could draw on them with thin alcohol-based colored markers to plan operations and mark check points, LD/LC (Line of Departure/Line of Contact), adjacent units, and such. In classes and training, for this reason, drawing all our “grand plans” on the map was referred to as “Daydreaming on Acetate.”

2. The Surovikin Line’s “huge success.” As I recall, Ukraine only reached those lines in one place (Robotyne) and they breached them in that one place. In Robotyne, the town itself was a huge problem. Elsewhere, how could the defenses prevent advance if they didn’t reach them? It was the minefields and the dispersed nature of the attack. And, for the most part, those minefields are still there, though somewhat degraded.